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Abstract
The theory of evolutionary variational inequalities fits very well in a lot of optimization problems, like for
example the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem that we describe in this paper. But here, the
authors analyze the behavior of control policies whose aim is to regulate the exportation through the adjustments
of supply taxes or incentives on the firms. This is considered as a policy-maker optimization problem. This
aspect is studied with the help of an inverse evolutionary variational formulation. Moreover, a characterization of 
the inverse variational inequality with an appropriate evolutionary variational inequality is given. Unlike the
paper (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013), here the authors explore the possibility of presence of production and 
demand excesses. Moreover, we provide a definition of equilibrium for the firms by using the infinite
dimensional duality theory and later we define an optimal regulatory tax. Finally, we present a numerical scheme 
in order to compute the equilibrium solution of the inverse variational inequality that models the policy-maker’s
point of view for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of excesses, then we provide
a numerical example.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
In this papers the authors want to improve the results obtained in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013). More
precisely, they give an optimal control perspective on the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem by
allowing the presence of both production and demand excesses. The authors want to describe a policy-maker
optimization problem since they permit that control policies may be imposed to regulate the amounts of 
exportation. In particular, the policy-maker may decide to impose higher taxes or subsidies in order to restrict or
encourage the exportation. The starting point is the analysis of the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium
problem in a supply-demand market between a finite number of spatially separated firms, through an appropriate
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variational inequality (Barbagallo & Cojocaru, 2009b). Here, the equilibrium conditions are given by means of 
Lagrange multipliers associated with capacity constraints and with production and demand excesses, but these 
equilibrium conditions can also be given, in a more practical but equivalent way, as a special case of dynamic 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium principle, see for instance (Barbagallo & Cojocaru, 2009b, Barbagallo & Maugeri, 
2011, Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012a, Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012c). Later, the optimal control perspective will be 
discussed through the help of inverse variational inequalities. Some existence and regularity results for the these 
inequalities are established. Moreover, the continuity of the equilibrium solution allows us to introduce a 
numerical method to solve the policy-maker’s point of view for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium 
problem. In particular, after a discretization procedure we solve the finite dimensional problems by using the 
self-adaptive projection method studied in (He & Liu, 2011). 
The equilibrium formulation between the firms involved in this problem, fits in the light of a dynamic 
noncooperative behavior. Cournot was the author who first analyzed the most trivial but seminal example of 
such problems considering the noncooperative behavior between two producers of a certain commodity, the so-
called duopoly problem (Cournot, 1838). Only with Nash, later, a more complete extension was considered. In 
particular, Nash introduced ݉ agents in his model nowadays called noncooperative game, each acting according 
to his own self-interest (Nash, 1950, Nash, 1951).  
The problem we consider is evolving in time. The importance of this assumption can be clearly gathered from 
M.J. Beckmann and J.P. Wallace's sentence in (Beckmann & Wallace, 1969): “The time-dependent formulation 
of equilibrium problems allows one to explore the dynamics of adjustment processes in which a delay on time 
response is operating”. This is the reason why in (Barbagallo & Cojocaru, 2009b), the authors introduced, for the 
first time, the dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium principle for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium 
problem. Moreover, the authors studied the related variational formulation in which the time-dependent process 
was one of the main features and proved the existence and regularity of a dynamic equilibrium solution. There 
exists a vast literature about existence and regularity results for the solutions to evolutionary variational 
inequalities, see for instance (Maugeri & Raciti, 2009, Barbagallo, 2007, Barbagallo, 2008, Barbagallo, 2009a, 
Barbagallo, 2009b, Barbagallo & Cojocaru, 2009a).  
It is also remarkable to study the sensitivity of solution, namely to see the consequences on the solution in 
correspondence of small changes of the data. This analysis is present in (Barbagallo & Maugeri, 2011) where the 
authors show that, under suitable assumptions, small changes of the solution happen in correspondence with 
small changes of the profit function. Moreover, in (Barbagallo & Maugeri, 2011) the authors, for the first time, 
describe the behavior of the market by means of the Lagrange multipliers taking into account the infinite 
dimensional duality theory developed in (Maugeri & Raciti, 2010, Daniele & Giuffrè, 2007, Daniele, Giuffrè & 
Maugeri, 2007, Daniele & Giuffrè, 2009). Such results make use of a particular algebraic definition of interior of 
sets, called quasi-relative interior (Borwein & Lewis, 1992), that allows to overcome the difficulty of the 
emptyness of the topological interior of the ordering cone which defines the constraints of many equilibrium 
problems. It is worth to emphasize that the main aim of Lagrange multipliers is to highlight the presence of 
constraints in the model so that it is easier to analyze the behavior of the market.  
In (Barbagallo & Maugeri, 2010) and (Barbagallo & Di Vincenzo, 2011), the adjustment processes in an 
oligopolistic market equilibrium model have been represented by means of a memory term which depends on 
previous equilibrium solutions according to the Volterra operator. In this way, it is possible to take into account 
of the delay on time response, that is a consequence of the finite speed of propagation of information through the 
economic network.  
The model presented in (Barbagallo & Cojocaru, 2009b) has been improved in a more realistic way by 
introducing the production excesses in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012a) and both production and demand excesses 
in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012c). In order to clarify the introduction of the model with both production and 
demand excesses we consider some concrete economic situations. During an economic crisis period the presence 
of production excesses can be due to a demand decrease in demand markets and, on the other hand, the presence 
of demand excesses may occur when the supply can not satisfy the demand especially for fundamental goods. 
Moreover, since the market model evolves in time, the presence of both production and demand excesses is a 
consequence of the fact that the physical transportation of commodity between a firm and a demand market is 
evidently limited, therefore, there can exist some time intervals in which some of the demand markets require 
more commodity, though some firms produce more commodity than they can send to all the demand markets. 
Finally, it is worth to remind that the existence and regularity results, proved in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012a, 
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Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012c), play an important role in order to introduce some numerical to compute the 
equilibrium solutions (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012b, Barbagallo, 2012).  
The goal of this paper is to follow the way traced in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013), namely instead of 
considering the problem from a producer’s point of view according to which the producers try to maximize their 
own profits, we draw our attention to the policy-maker’s perspective according to which the policy-maker 
imposes control policies to regulate the amount of exportations. To this aim, we make use of inverse variational 
inequalities that can be considered as a special case of general variational inequalities introduced in (Noor, 2004) 
and can be used to model various control problems. An inverse variational inequality problem formally consists 
in finding ݔכ א Թ௡ such that 
 
 ݂(ݔכ) א ߗ:     ۦݔ െ ݂(ݔכ), ݔכۧ ൑ 0,        ׊ݔ א ߗ,                                                                                         (1) 
 
where ߗ is a nonempty subset of Թ௡ and ݂:Թ௡ ืԹ௡. Unlike the classical variational inequalities, in such a 
problem the equilibrium state ݂(ݔכ) has to belong to the feasible set, whereas the feasibility is not required for 
the variable ݔכ. Only recently the strict connection between the classical variational inequalities and inverse 
variational inequalities has been unveiled but, despite everything, there exists an always increasing number of 
problems that can be described through an evolutionary variational inequality.  
In (He, He & Liu, 2010) the authors, for the first time, studied a general network economic equilibrium 
problem with the help of an inverse static variational inequality. Later, in (Yang, 2008), the power price problem 
is discussed in both the discrete and the evolutionary case and the optimal price is characterized as a solution of 
an inverse variational inequality. Recently, in (Scrimali, 2011) an optimal control perspective on the dynamic 
spatial price equilibrium problem has been afforded by underlining the equivalence with an evolutionary inverse 
variational inequality.  
In this paper we prove the equivalence of the inverse variational inequality, which allows the system to 
control the commodity exportations by means of the imposition of taxes or incentives with an evolutionary 
variational inequality (see Theorem 3.2). This enables to exploit all the powerful tools of evolutionary 
variational inequalities that allow us to treat completely this problem and analyze the questions about the 
existence, the regularity and the computation of solution.  
At last, we refer to the papers devoted to the Walrasian equilibrium problem (Donato, Milasi & Vitanza, 
2008a, Donato, Milasi & Vitanza, 2008b, Donato, Milasi & Vitanza, 2010), to the financial equilibrium problem 
(Daniele, 2003, Barbagallo, Daniele & Maugeri, 2012, Barbagallo, Daniele, Lorino, Maugeri & Mirabella, 2013, 
Barbagallo, A., Daniele, P., Giuffrè, S. & Maugeri, A., 2013) and to the projected dynamical systems (Giuffrè, 
Idone & Pia, 2008, as outstanding examples of the power of the variational inequality methodology. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is described and we give the equilibrium conditions 
from the firms’ point of view by determining a nonnegative commodity distribution for which the firms and the 
demand markets will be in a state of equilibrium. In Section 3 we face the problem from the policy-maker’s 
point of view and show the equivalence between the optimal control equilibrium conditions and an inverse 
variational inequality. Moreover, we present the equivalence of this inverse variational inequality with an 
appropriate evolutionary variational inequality. In Section 4 we provide existence and regularity results for the 
equilibrium solution making use of the equivalent variational inequality.  Finally, in Section 5, taking into 
account the regularity results for the inverse variational inequality associated with the policy-maker’s point of 
view for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of excesses, we introduce a 
numerical method to compute the equilibrium solution. In particular, for the continuity of the solution, we can 
discretize the time interval [0,ܶ] and then we compute, by means of the self-adaptive projection method, the 
solutions of the finite dimensional inverse variational inequalities obtained by using the discretization over time. 
Then, we construct an approximate solution with a linear interpolation. Section 6 is devoted to provide a 
numerical example. We end the paper with some concluding remarks. 
2. The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem: the firms' point of view 
Let us consider ݉ firms ௜ܲ , ݅ = 1, … ,݉, that produce a homogeneous commodity and ݊ demand markets 
ܳ௝ , ݆ = 1, … ,݊, that are generally spatially separated. Assume that the homogeneous commodity, produced by 
the ݉ firms and consumed by the ݊ demand markets, is involved during a time interval [0,ܶ], ܶ > 0. 
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Let ݌௜(ݐ), ݅ = 1, … ,݉, denote the nonnegative commodity output produced by firm ௜ܲ  at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. 
Let ݍ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1, … ,݊, denote the nonnegative commodity demand for the commodity at demand market ܳ௝  at 
the time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. Let ݔ௜௝(ݐ), ݅ = 1, … ,݉, ݆ = 1, … ,݊, denote the nonnegative shipment between the supply 
market ௜ܲ  and the demand market  ܳ௝   at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. In particular, let us set the vector ݔ௜(ݐ) =
൫ݔ௜ଵ(ݐ), … , ݔ௜௡(ݐ)൯, ݅ = 1, … ,݉, ݐ א [0,ܶ] as the strategy vector for the firm ௜ܲ . Finally, let us introduce the 
production and demand excesses. Let ߝ௜(ݐ), ݅ = 1, … ,݉, be the nonnegative production excess for the 
commodity of the firm ௜ܲ , at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. Let ߜ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1, … ,݊, be the nonnegative demand excess for the 
commodity of the demand market ܳ௝ , at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. 
Let us group the production output into a vector-function ݌: [0,ܶ]ืԹା௠, the demand output into a vector-
function ݍ: [0,ܶ]ืԹା௡ , the commodity shipments into a matrix-function ݔ: [0,ܶ]ืԹା௠௡, the production 
excess into a vector-function ߝ: [0,ܶ]ืԹା௠, and the demand excess into a vector-function ߜ: [0,ܶ]ืԹା௡ . 
Let us assume that the following feasibility conditions hold: 
 
݌௜(ݐ) =  ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ) + ߝ௜(ݐ), ݅ = 1, … ,݉,
௡
௝ୀଵ
   ݍ௝(ݐ) =  ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ) + ߜ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1, … ,݉,
௠
௜ୀଵ
  a. e. in [0,ܶ].  
 
Hence, the first condition states that the quantity produced by each firm ௜ܲ , at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ], must be 
equal to the commodity shipments from that firm to all the demand markets plus the production excess, at the 
same time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. Moreover, the second condition states that the quantity demanded by each demand market 
ܳ௝ , at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ], must be equal to the commodity shipments from all the firms to that demand markets 
plus the demand excess, at the same time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. 
Taking into account the previous equalities, since the production excess ߝ௜(ݐ), at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ], and the 
demand excess ߜ௝(ݐ), at the same time ݐ א [0,ܶ], are nonnegative, we have 
 
෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
௡
௝ୀଵ
݌௜(ݐ), ݅ = 1, … ,݉, ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
௠
௜ୀଵ
ݍ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1, … ,݊, a. e. in [0,ܶ].    
 
Furthermore, we assume that the nonnegative commodity shipment ݔ௜௝  between the producer ௜ܲ  and the 
demand market ܳ௝  has to satisfy time-dependent constraints, namely there exist two nonnegative functions 
ݔ, ݔ: [0,ܶ]ืԹା௠௡  such that 0 ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),   ׊݅ = 1, … ,݉,׊݆ = 1, … ,݊, a.e. in [0,ܶ]. For 
technical reasons, let us assume that ݔ, ݔ, ݔ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡), ߝ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠), ߜ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௡) and, then, 
݌ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠), ݍ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௡). Then, the set of feasible vectors is 
 
ॶ = ൛ݔ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡): ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),   ׊݅ = 1, … ,݉,׊݆ = 1, … ,݊, a. e. in [0,ܶ],                         
 
                ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
௡
௝ୀଵ
݌௜(ݐ), ݅ = 1, … ,݉, a. e. in [0,ܶ] ,         ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
௠
௜ୀଵ
ݍ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1, … ,݊, a. e. in [0,ܶ]ൡ       (2) 
 
Moreover, let us associate each firm ௜ܲ  with a production cost ௜݂ , ݅ = 1, … ,݉, and assume that the production 
cost of a firm ௜ܲ  may depend upon the entire production pattern, namely, ௜݂ = ௜݂൫ݐ,ݔ(ݐ)൯.       
Similarly, let us associate each demand market ܳ௝  with a demand price for unity of the commodity ௝݀ , ݆ =
1, … ,݊, and assume that the demand price of a demand market ܳ௝  may depend upon the entire production 
pattern, namely, ௝݀ = ݀௝൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯. Moreover we have to consider also the storage of commodity, since we allow 
production excesses, so we suppose that the function ݃௜ , ݅ = 1, … ,݉, denotes the storage cost of the commodity 
produced by firm ௜ܲ  and assume that this cost may depend upon the entire production pattern, namely, ݃௜ =
݃௜൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯. Finally, let ܿ௜௝ , ݅ = 1, … ,݉, ݆ = 1, … ,݊,  denote the transaction cost, which includes the 
transportation cost associated with trading the commodity between firm ௜ܲ  and demand market ܳ௝ . Here, we 
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permit the transaction cost to depend upon the entire shipment pattern, namely, ܿ௜௝ = ܿ௜௝൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯.       
We have the following mappings, ݂,݃: [0,ܶ] × ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡)ื ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠),  ݀: [0,ܶ] × ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡)
ื ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௡),  ܿ: [0,ܶ] × ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡)ื ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡).  
Let ߟ௜௝(ݐ) be the supply or resource tax imposed on supply market ௜ܲ  for the transaction with the demand 
market ܳ௝ , at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ].  Let ߣ௜௝(ݐ) be the incentives imposed on supply market ௜ܲ  for the transaction 
with the demand market ܳ௝ , at the same time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. Moreover, let ݄௜௝(ݐ) be the difference between the 
supply tax ߟ௜௝(ݐ) and the incentives ߣ௜௝(ݐ) for the transaction between the supply market ௜ܲ  and the demand 
market ܳ௝  at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ], namely, ݄௜௝(ݐ) = ߟ௜௝(ݐ)െ  ߣ௜௝(ݐ) . For technical reasons we suppose that 
ߟ, ߣ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡), then, we have ݄ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡).  
The profit ݒ௜൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯, ݅ = 1, … ,݉, of the firm ௜ܲ  at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ] is, then, 
 
ݒ௜൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ =෍ ௝݀൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ݔ௜௝(ݐ) െ  ௜݂൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ െ  ݃௜൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ െ  ෍ܿ௜௝൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ݔ௜௝(ݐ) െ 
௡
௝ୀଵ
௡
௝ୀଵ
෍݄௜௝(ݐ)ݔ௜௝(ݐ),
௡
௝ୀଵ
 
 
namely, it is equal to the price that the demand markets are disposed to pay minus the production costs, the 
storage costs, the transportation costs and taxes. 
Moreover, we recall that in the Hilbert space ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௞) we define the canonical bilinear form on 
(ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௞))כ × ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௞)  , by 
 
ا ߮,߱ ب= න < ߮(ݐ),߱(ݐ) > ݀ݐ,
்
଴
 
 
where ߮ א (ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௞))כ = ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௞) , ߱ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௞) and < ߮(ݐ),߱(ݐ) >=  σ ߮௟(ݐ)߱௟(ݐ).௞௟ୀଵ  
Now, let us consider the dynamic oligopolistic market, in which the ݉ firms supply the commodity in a 
noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own profit at the time ݐ א [0,ܶ]. We seek to determine a 
nonnegative commodity distribution matrix-function ݔכ for which the ݉ firms and the ݊ demand markets will be 
in a state of equilibrium according to the dynamic Cournot-Nash principle. 
 
Definition 2.1 ݔכ א  ॶ is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of excesses if and only if for 
each ݅ = 1, … ,݉, ܽ. ݁. ݅݊ [0,ܶ] we have 
 
ݒ௜(ݐ, ݔכ(ݐ)) ൒ ݒ௜(ݐ, ݔ௜(ݐ), ݔො௜כ(ݐ))         (3) 
 
where ݔ௜(ݐ) = ൫ݔ௜ଵ(ݐ), … , ݔ௜௡(ݐ)൯, and ݔො௜כ(ݐ) = ൫ݔଵכ(ݐ), … , ݔ௜ିଵכ (ݐ), ݔ௜ାଵכ (ݐ), … , ݔ௠כ (ݐ)൯. 
 
Definition 2.1 states that each firm ௜ܲ  maximizes its own profit considered the given optimal strategy ݔො௜כ of 
the other firms. 
It is worth to emphasize that, under suitable assumptions, this definition is equivalent to the following 
evolutionary variational inequality (see Theorem 3.2 in (Barbagallo & Cojocaru, 2009b) for a complete proof) 
 
න ෍෍ቆെ
߲ݒ௜(ݐ, ݔכ(ݐ))
߲ݔ௜௝
ቇ ൫ݔ௜௝(ݐ) െ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)൯݀ݐ ൒ 0,   ׊ݔ א ॶ.                                                                               (4)
௡
௝ୀଵ
௠
௜ୀଵ
்
଴
 
 
Moreover, we can express the equilibrium condition in terms of the Lagrange multipliers, which are very 
useful in order to point out the importance of the constraints in the problem. 
 
Definition 2.2 ݔכ א ॶ is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of excesses if, for each 
݅ = 1, … ,݉, ݆ = 1, … ,݊, ܽ݊݀ ܽ. ݁. ݅݊ [0,ܶ], ݐ݄݁ݎ݁ ݁ݔ݅ݏݐ ߣ௜௝כ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ]),ߩ௜௝כ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ]),  ߤ௜כ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ]),  ߥ௝כ א
ܮଶ([0,ܶ]) such that  
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െ
߲ݒ௜൫ݐ, ݔכ(ݐ)൯
߲ݔ௜௝
+ ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) +  ߤ௜כ(ݐ) +  ߥ௝כ(ݐ) = ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ),                                                                                                      (5)  
ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ)൫ݔ௜௝(ݐ)െ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)൯ = 0,   ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) ൒ 0,                                                                                                                          (6) 
 
ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) ቀݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)െ ݔ௜௝(ݐ)ቁ = 0,   ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) ൒ 0,                                                                                                                        (7) 
 
ߤ௜כ(ݐ)ቌ෍ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)െ ݌௜(ݐ)
௡
௝ୀଵ
ቍ = 0,   ߤ௜כ(ݐ) ൒ 0,                                                                                                                   (8) 
 
ߥ௝כ(ݐ)൭෍ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) െ ݍ௝(ݐ)
௠
௜ୀଵ
൱ = 0,   ߥ௝כ(ݐ) ൒ 0.                                                                                                                     (9) 
 
The terms ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ), ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ),  ߤ௜כ(ݐ),  ߥ௝כ(ݐ) are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) ൒
ݔ௜௝(ݐ), ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),σ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)  ൑ ௡௝ୀଵ ݌௜(ݐ) and  σ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)  ൑ ௠௜ୀଵ ݍ௝(ݐ), respectively.  
They, as it is well known, have a topical importance on the understanding and the management of the market. 
In fact, at a fixed time ݐ א [0,ܶ], we have: 
 
1. if ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) > 0  then, by using (15), we obtain ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) = ݔ௜௝(ݐ), namely the commodity shipment between 
the firm ௜ܲ  and the demand market ܳ௝  is minimum; 
2. if ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) > ݔ௜௝(ݐ) then, taking into account (15), we obtain  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) = 0 and, making use of (14), it 
results ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) + ߤ௜כ(ݐ) + ߥ௝כ(ݐ) =  
డ௩೔൫௧,௫כ(௧)൯
డ௫೔ೕ
, namely ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) +  ߤ௜כ(ݐ) + ߥ௝כ(ݐ) is equal to the marginal 
profit; 
3. if ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) > 0  then, by using (16), we obtain ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) = ݔ௜௝(ݐ), namely the commodity shipment between 
the firm ௜ܲ  and the demand market ܳ௝  is maximum; 
4. if ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) < ݔ௜௝(ݐ) then, taking into account (16), we obtain  ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) = 0 and, making use of (14), it 
results  ߤ௜כ(ݐ) + ߥ௝כ(ݐ) െ  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) =  
డ௩೔൫௧,௫כ(௧)൯
డ௫೔ೕ
, namely ߤ௜כ(ݐ) +  ߥ௝כ(ݐ) െ  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) is equal to the marginal 
profit; 
5. if ߤ௜כ(ݐ) > 0 then, for the condition (17), we have σ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) = ௡௝ୀଵ ݌௜(ݐ), namely there is no production 
excess for the firm ௜ܲ; 
6. if σ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)  < ௡௝ୀଵ ݌௜(ݐ), as a consequence of (17) we get ߤ௜כ(ݐ) = 0 and, for the condition (14), ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) +
 ߥ௝כ(ݐ) െ  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) =  
డ௩೔൫௧,௫כ(௧)൯
డ௫೔ೕ
, namely ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) + ߥ௝כ(ݐ)െ  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) is equal to the marginal profit; 
7. if ߤ௝כ(ݐ) > 0 then, for the condition (18), we have σ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ) = ௠௜ୀଵ ݍ௝(ݐ), namely there is no demand 
excess for the demand market ܳ௝; 
8. if σ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)  < ௠௜ୀଵ ݍ௝(ݐ), as a consequence of (18) we get ߥ௝כ(ݐ) = 0 and, for the condition (14), ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) +
 ߤ௜כ(ݐ) െ  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) =  
డ௩೔൫௧,௫כ(௧)൯
డ௫೔ೕ
, namely ߩ௜௝כ (ݐ) +  ߤ௜כ(ݐ)െ  ߣ௜௝כ (ݐ) is equal to the marginal profit. 
 
Let us underline that in Definition 2.2, even if in (5) - (9) the unknown Lagrange multipliers ߣ௜௝כ , ߩ௜௝כ ,  ߤ௜כ,  ߥ௝כ 
appear, they do not influence the equilibrium definition because it is  equivalent to evolutionary variational 
inequality (4) and, consequently, to Definition 2.1.The proof of the characterization is based on delicate tools of 
Nonlinear Analysis regarding the infinite dimensional duality theory (see (Maugeri & Raciti, 2010, Daniele & 
Giuffré, 2007, Daniele, Giuffré & Maugeri, 2007, Daniele & Giuffré, 2009)). More precisely, you can refer to 
(Barbagallo & Mauro, 2012c) for a complete proof. 
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3. The inverse problem: the policy-maker’s point of view 
In this section, the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem will be discussed from the policy-
maker’s point of view and a time-dependent optimal control equilibrium problem will be presented. In particular, 
we introduce an optimal control problem in which the variable ݄ represents the difference between the supply 
tax ߟ and the incentives ߣ for the transactions. As a consequence, the term ݄ presented in Section 2, previously 
considered as a fixed parameter, is now considered a variable. This represents the typical policy-maker’s point of 
view. In this perspective, it is possible to control the resource exploitations ݔ൫݄(ݐ)൯ at supply markets by 
adjusting taxes ݄(ݐ). Namely, the tax adjustment becomes an efficient mean of regulating exportation. More 
precisely, if the policy-maker is concerned with the restriction of exportation and, consequently, of production of 
a certain commodity, then the government will impose higher taxes, whereas if the policy-maker aims to 
encourage exportation of a certain commodity, the government will impose subsidies. Following the way traced 
in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013), we introduce the function of regulatory taxes ݔ(݄) = ݔ(ݐ, ݄), so ݔ: [0,ܶ] ×
Թ௠௡ ื Թ௠௡ , since ݄(ݐ) א Թ௠௡ ,׊ݐ א [0,ܶ]. We suppose that ݔ(ݐ, ݄) is a Carathéodory function and we require 
also that there exists ߛ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ]) such that,  ԡݔ(ݐ, ݄(ݐ))ԡ௠௡ ൑ ߛ(ݐ) + ԡ݄(ݐ)ԡ௠௡ , a.e. in [0,ܶ]. Therefore, 
ݔ: [0,ܶ] × ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡)ื ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡), which assigns to each regulatory tax ݄(ݐ) the exportation vector 
ݔ൫݄(ݐ)൯.We now introduce the set of feasible states  
 
ȳ = ൛߱ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡): ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ߱௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),   ׊݅ = 1, … ,݉,׊݆ = 1, … ,݊, a. e. in [0,ܶ]ൟ, 
 
and define the optimal regulatory tax as follows. 
 
Definition 3.1 A vector ݄כ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡) is an optimal regulatory tax if and only if  ݔ(ݐ, ݄כ) א ߗ and for 
݅ = 1, … ,݉, ݆ = 1, … ,݊ ܽ݊݀ ܽ. ݁. ݅݊ [0,ܶ] the following conditions hold: 
 
ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ = ݔ௜௝(ݐ)֜  ݄௜௝כ (ݐ) ൑ 0,                                                                                                                         (10) 
 
ݔ௜௝(ݐ) < ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ <ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ֜  ݄௜௝כ (ݐ) = 0,                                                                                                         (11) 
 
ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ = ݔ௜௝(ݐ)֜  ݄௜௝כ (ݐ) ൒ 0.                                                                                                                         (12) 
 
Let us remark that Definition 3.1 has a significant meaning. First of all, the optimal regulatory tax ݄כ is such 
that the corresponding state ݔ(ݐ, ݄כ) has to satisfy capacity constraints, namely ݔ(ݐ, ݄כ) א ߗ. Moreover, if one 
requires that ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ = ݔ௜௝(ݐ), then it means to encourage the exportations, namely the optimal choice is 
that taxes must be less than or equal to the incentives. If one requires that ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ = ݔ௜௝(ݐ), then the 
exportations must be reduced, hence taxes must be greater than or equal to the incentives. Finally, if ݔ௜௝(ݐ) <
ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ <ݔ௜௝(ݐ) is satisfied, taxes are equal to incentives. It is possible to prove that the optimal regulatory 
tax conditions are equivalent to an evolutionary inverse variational inequality. This equivalence can be 
established by using analogous techniques of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013). 
 
Theorem 3.1 ݄כ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թା௠௡) is an optimal regulatory tax if  and only if it solves the evolutionary 
inverse variational inequality: 
 
ݔ(ݐ, ݄כ) א ߗ:   න ෍෍ቀ߱௜௝(ݐ) െ ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ቁ ݄௜௝כ (ݐ)݀ݐ ൑ 0,   ׊߱ א ߗ.                                                    (13)
௡
௝ୀଵ
௠
௜ୀଵ
்
଴
 
 
Let us note that (13) can be rewritten as a classical variational inequality. This formulation is important to 
obtain existence and regularity results making use of all the theoretical and numerical advances in the theory of 
variational inequalities. If we set ܹ = ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௠௡) × ߗ,   ܨ: [0,ܶ] ×ܹ ื ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թଶ௠௡),  
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ݖ(ݐ) = ൬
݄(ݐ)
߱(ݐ)൰,   and   ܨ൫ݐ, ݖ(ݐ)൯ = ቆ
߱(ݐ) െ ݔ൫ݐ, ݄(ݐ)൯
െ݄(ݐ)
ቇ, 
it is possible to prove that evolutionary inverse variational inequality problem (13) is equivalent to an 
evolutionary variational inequality, as you can see with the following result (see (Yang, 2008, Th. 4.8) and 
(Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013, Th. 3.2)): 
 
Theorem 3.2 The evolutionary inverse variational inequality problem (13) is equivalent to the evolutionary 
variational inequality 
 
ݖכ א ܹ:   න ෍෍ܨ௟௝൫ݐ, ݖכ(ݐ)൯ ቀݖ௟௝(ݐ) െ ݖ௟௝כ (ݐ)ቁ ݀ݐ ൒ 0,   ׊ݖ א ܹ.                                                             (14)
௡
௝ୀଵ
ଶ௠
௟ୀଵ
்
଴
 
 
4. Existence and regularity results 
In this section we recall some existence and regularity results for the evolutionary variational inequalities. We 
first remind some useful definitions (Maugeri & Raciti, 2009). Let ܺ be a reflexive Banach space, ॶ a subset of 
ܺ and ܺכ the dual space of ܺ. 
 
Definition 4.1 A mapping ܣ:ॶื ܺכ is monotone if and only if for all ݑ, ݒ א ॶ, < ܣݑ െ ܣݒ,ݑ െ ݒ >൒ 0. 
 
Definition 4.2 A mapping ܣ:ॶื ܺכ is pseudomonotone in the sense of Karamardian if and only if for all 
ݑ, ݒ א ॶ, < ܣݒ,ݑ െ ݒ >൒ 0 ֜ < ܣݑ,ݑ െ ݒ >൒ 0. 
 
Definition 4.3 Let, now, ॶ be a convex subset of ܺ. A mapping ܣ:ॶื ܺכ is lower hemicontinuous along 
line segments, if and only if the function ߦ ฽ < ܣߦ,ݑ െ ݒ > is lower hemicontinuous for all ݑ, ݒ א ॶ on the line 
segments [ݑ, ݒ]. 
 
We, now, state the following existence result (for the proof see Theorem 3.6 in (Maugeri & Raciti, 2009)). 
 
Theorem 4.1 Let us set ܨ: [0,ܶ] ×ܹ ื ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թଶ௠௡), ܹ = ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թ௠௡) × ߗ,  and suppose that ܨ is 
K-pseudomonotone and lower hemicontinuous along line segments. Let us further suppose that there exists 
ݖ଴ א ॶ ܽ݊݀ ܴ > ԡݖ଴ԡ such that 
 
 ا ܨݖ, ݖ െ ݖ଴ ب> 0,   ׊ݖ א ܹ ת {ݖ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թଶ௠௡): ԡݖԡ = ܴ}.                                                                     (15) 
 
Then, it is possible to find a solution to the variational inequality  
 
ا ܨݖכ, ݖ െ ݖכ ب൒ 0,   ׊ݖ א ܹ. 
 
Remark 4.1 In particular, the monotonicity assumption on the operator ܨ is equivalent to the monotonicity of 
function െݔ (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013). 
 
Remark 4.2 As proved in (Brezis, 1968), relationship (15) is ensured under condition that 
 
lim
ԡ௭ԡืାஶ
௭אௐ
ا ܨݖ, ݖ ب
ԡݖԡ
= +λ, 
or, equivalently, for the evident equivalence between the monotonicity of ܨ and the monotonicity of – ݔ, 
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lim
ԡ௭ԡืାஶ
௭אௐ
ا െݔ(݄), ݄ ب
ԡݖԡ
= +λ. 
 
The utility of Theorem 4.1 lies in the fact that the lower hemicontinuity is ensured by (15). Moreover, 
operator ܨ is monotone. The continuity of solutions on the interval [0,ܶ], may be ensured by continuity 
assumptions on data (Barbagallo, 2007, Barbagallo, 2008, Barbagallo, 2009a, Barbagallo 2009b, Barbagallo & 
Cojocaru, 2009b). 
 
5. A numerical scheme for the inverse problem 
Let us present a method to solve the evolutionary inverse variational inequality which expresses the policy-
maker’s point of view for a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of excesses. We 
suppose that the assumptions which ensure the continuity of solution are satisfy.  
In the following, applying a discretization procedure and making use of the self-adaptive projection method 
(He & Liu, 2011), we compute the solutions of the inverse evolutionary variational inequality which expresses 
the inverse problem for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem in presence of excesses. 
Let us consider a partition of [0,ܶ], such that 0 = ݐ଴ < ݐଵ < ڮ < ݐ௥ < ڮ < ݐே = ܶ. For each point ݐ௥, 
r= 0,1, … ,ܰ, of the partition, we consider the finite-dimensional inverse variational inequality 
ݔ൫ݐ௥ , ݄כ(ݐ௥)൯ א ߗ(ݐ௥):   ෍෍ቀ߱௜௝(ݐ௥)െ ݔ௜௝൫ݐ௥ , ݄כ(ݐ௥)൯ቁ ݄௜௝כ (ݐ௥) ൑ 0,   ׊߱ א ߗ(ݐ௥).                              (16) 
௡
௝ୀଵ
௠
௜ୀଵ
 
We compute, now, the solution to finite dimensional inverse variational inequality (16) making use of a 
generalized version of the self-adaptive projection method introduced by He and Liu in (He, Liu, 2011). 
The algorithm starts from any ݑ଴(ݐ௥) א ߗ(ݐ௥) and setting Ɋ > 1, ߜ א (0,2),  ߚ଴ > 0 and ݇ = 0. Then, 
compute ݎ(ݑ௞(ݐ௥),ߚ௞) by 
 
ݎ(ݑ௞(ݐ௥),ߚ௞) =
ଵ
ఉೖ
ቂݔ൫ݑ௞(ݐ௥)൯ െ Զॶൣݔ൫ݑ௞(ݐ௥)൯ െ ߚ௞ݑ௞(ݐ௥)൧ቃ,   for ݇ א Գ. 
Then, we update ݑ௞ାଵ(ݐ௥)  by  ݑ௞ାଵ(ݐ௥) = ݑ௞(ݐ௥)െ ݎ(ݑ௞(ݐ௥),ߚ௞), in which ߚ௞ is determined by finding the 
smallest nonnegative integer ݈௞ such that ߚ௞ = Ɋ௟ೖߚ௞ିଵ and ݑ௞ାଵ(ݐ௥) satisfies  
 
ฮݔ൫ݑ௞(ݐ௥)൯ െ ݔ൫ݑ௞ାଵ(ݐ௥)൯ฮ
ଶ
ߚ௞[ݑ௞(ݐ௥)െ ݑ௞ାଵ(ݐ௥)]்ൣݔ൫ݑ௞(ݐ௥)൯ െ ݔ൫ݑ௞ାଵ(ݐ௥)൯൧
൑ 2 െ ߜ. 
We remark that a sufficient condition for the convergence of the method is the co-coercivity of the function 
ݔ, see (He & Liu, 2011), namely there exists a positive constant ߬ > 0 such that  
  
(ݑ െ ݒ)்൫ݔ(ݑ) െ ݔ(ݒ)൯ ൒ ߬ԡݔ(ݑ) െ ݔ(ݒ)ԡଶ, ׊ݑ, ݒ א ߗ. 
6. Numerical results 
Let us consider two firms and two demand markets. Let ݔ,ݔ  א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թସ) be the capacity constraints such 
that, a.e. in [0,1], 
 
ݔ(ݐ) = ቀ0 2ݐ
0 2ݐቁ , ݔ
(ݐ) = ቀ100ݐ 200ݐ
100ݐ 200ݐቁ, 
 
and ݌, ݍ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թଶ) be the production and demand functions such that, a.e. in [0,1], 
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݌(ݐ) = ቀ250ݐ
500ݐ
ቁ , ݍ(ݐ) = ቀ400ݐ
500ݐቁ, 
 
As a consequence, the feasible set is  
 
ॶ = ൛ݔ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թାସ ): ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),   ׊݅ = 1,2,׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1],  
 
  ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
݌௜(ݐ), ݅ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1],         ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
ݍ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1]ൡ. 
 
The set of feasible states is  
 
ȳ = ൛߱ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թାସ ): ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ߱௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),   ׊݅ = 1,2,׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,ܶ]ൟ. 
 
Let us consider the profit function ݒ א ܮଶ([0,1] × ܮଶ([0,1],Թସ),Թଶ) defined by  
 
ݒଵ൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ = 6ݔଵଵଶ (ݐ) + 2ݔଵଶଶ (ݐ) + 2ߙ(ݐ)ݔଵଶ(ݐ) െ 2ݔଵଵ(ݐ)ݔଵଶ(ݐ) െ 4ݔଶଵ(ݐ)ݔଶଶ(ݐ)െ 2݄ଵଵ(ݐ)ݔଵଵ(ݐ)
െ 2݄ଵଶ(ݐ)ݔଵଶ(ݐ), 
 
        ݒଶ൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ = 6ݔଶଵଶ (ݐ) + 2ݔଶଶଶ (ݐ) + 2ߚ(ݐ)ݔଶଶ(ݐ)െ 4ݔଶଵ(ݐ)ݔଶଶ(ݐ) െ 2ݔଵଵ(ݐ)ݔଵଶ(ݐ) െ 4݄ଶଵ(ݐ)ݔଶଵ(ݐ)
െ 4݄ଶଶ(ݐ)ݔଶଶ(ݐ), 
 
where ߙ,ߚ are suitable functions depending on time and belonging to ܮଶ([0,1]). Then, the operator 
׏஽ݒ൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ = ൬
డ௩೔൫௧,௫(௧)൯
డ௫೔ೕ
൰
௜ୀଵ,ଶ
א ܮଶ([0,1] × ܮଶ([0,1],Թସ),Թସ) is given by 
 
ߘ஽ݒ൫ݐ, ݔ(ݐ)൯ = ൬
12ݔଵଵ(ݐ)െ 2ݔଵଶ(ݐ) െ 2݄ଵଵ(ݐ) 4ݔଵଶ(ݐ)െ 2ݔଵଵ(ݐ) െ 2݄ଵଶ(ݐ) + 2ߙ(ݐ)
12ݔଶଵ(ݐ)െ 4ݔଶଶ(ݐ)െ 4݄ଶଵ(ݐ) 4ݔଶଶ(ݐ)െ 4ݔଶଵ(ݐ)െ 4݄ଶଶ(ݐ) + 2ߚ(ݐ)
൰. 
 
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is the solution to the 
evolutionary variational inequality: 
 
න ෍෍ቆെ
߲ݒ௜(ݐ, ݔכ(ݐ))
߲ݔ௜௝
ቇ ൫ݔ௜௝(ݐ) െ ݔ௜௝כ (ݐ)൯݀ݐ ൒ 0,   ׊ݔ א ॶ.                                                                               (17)
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
்
଴
 
 
In order to compute the solution to (17) we make use of the direct method (Maugeri, 1987, Daniele & Maugeri, 
2002, Daniele, 2003). 
We consider the following system 
 
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
െ12ݔଵଵכ (ݐ) + 2ݔଵଶכ (ݐ) + 2݄ଵଵ(ݐ) = 0,
2ݔଵଵכ (ݐ) െ 4ݔଵଶכ (ݐ) + 2݄ଵଶ(ݐ) െ 2ߙ(ݐ) = 0,
െ12ݔଶଵכ (ݐ) + 4ݔଶଶכ (ݐ) + 4݄ଶଵ(ݐ) = 0,
4ݔଶଵכ (ݐ) െ 4ݔଶଶכ (ݐ) + 4݄ଶଶ(ݐ) െ 2ߚ(ݐ) = 0,
ݔכ א  ॶ
 
 
and we get the following solution, a.e.in [0,1], 
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ݔכ൫ݐ, ݄(ݐ)൯ = ൮
2݄ଵଵ(ݐ) + ݄ଵଶ(ݐ) െ ߙ(ݐ)
11
݄ଵଵ(ݐ) + ͸݄ଵଶ(ݐ) െ 6ߙ(ݐ)
11
2݄ଶଵ(ݐ) + ʹ݄ଶଶ(ݐ) െ ߚ(ݐ)
4
2݄ଶଵ(ݐ) + 6݄ଶଶ(ݐ) െ 3ߚ(ݐ)
4
൲ . 
 
In order to study the policy-maker’s point of view, we have to solve the following inverse variational inequality 
 
න ቌ෍෍ቀ߱௜௝כ (ݐ)െ ݔ௜௝൫ݐ, ݄כ(ݐ)൯ቁ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
ቀ݄௜௝(ݐ) െ ݄௜௝כ (ݐ)ቁ െ෍෍݄௜௝כ (ݐ) ቀ߱௜௝(ݐ) െ߱௜௝כ (ݐ)ቁ
ଶ
௝ୀଵ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
ቍ ݀ݐ ൒ 0
்
଴
, 
 
      ׊(݄,߱) א ܮଶ([0,1],Թସ) × ߗ.                                                                                                                                        (18)  
 
Let us assume that ߱௜௝(ݐ) = ߱௜௝כ (ݐ),׊݅ = 1,2,׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1], in (18). As a consequence, we can 
consider the following system 
 
ە
۔
ۓ
2݄ଵଵכ (ݐ) + ݄ଵଶכ (ݐ) െ ߙ(ݐ) െ 11߱ଵଵכ (ݐ) = 0,
݄ଵଵכ (ݐ) + ͸݄ଵଶכ (ݐ) െ 6ߙ(ݐ) െ 11߱ଵଶכ (ݐ) = 0,
2݄ଶଵכ (ݐ) + ʹ݄ଶଶכ (ݐ) െ ߚ(ݐ) െ 4߱ଶଵכ (ݐ) = 0,
2݄ଶଵכ (ݐ) + ͸݄ଶଶכ (ݐ)െ 3ߚ(ݐ) െ 4߱ଶଶכ (ݐ) = 0,
 
 
and we obtain the following solution, a. e. in [0,1], 
 
݄כ(ݐ) = ቌ
6߱ଵଵכ (ݐ)െ ߱ଵଶכ (ݐ) െ߱ଵଵכ (ݐ) + 2߱ଵଶכ (ݐ) + ߙ(ݐ)
3߱ଶଵכ (ݐ)െ ߱ଶଶכ (ݐ) െ߱ଶଵכ (ݐ) + ߱ଶଶכ (ݐ) +
1
2
ߚ(ݐ)
ቍ. 
 
Let us study, now, the case 
 
߱כ(ݐ) = ቀ100ݐ 2ݐ
100ݐ 200ݐቁ. 
 
Taking into account the direct method, it must be ݄ଵଵכ (ݐ) > 0, ݄ଵଶכ (ݐ) < 0, ݄ଶଵכ (ݐ) > 0, ݄ଶଶכ (ݐ) > 0.   These 
conditions are true if and only if ߙ(ݐ) < 96ݐ and ߚ(ݐ) > െ200ݐ. In this case the optimal regulatory tax and the 
optimal commodity distribution are, respectively 
 
݄כ(ݐ) = ቆ
598ݐ ߙ(ݐ) െ 96ݐ
100ݐ ଵ
ଶ
ߚ(ݐ) + 100ݐቇ,     ݔ
כ(ݐ) = ቀ100ݐ 2ݐ
100ݐ 200ݐቁ, 
 
which belongs to ॶ. The production and demand excesses are ߝ(ݐ) = ቀ148ݐ
200ݐቁ , ߜ
(ݐ) = ቀ200ݐ
298ݐቁ, respectively. 
In particular, if Ƚ(t) = 50t െ 50, Ⱦ(t) = 200t + 50, by the algorithm described in the previous section, 
we obtain the solution shown in Figure 1. It represents the numerical approximation of the following exact 
optimal regulatory tax: 
 
݄כ(ݐ) = ቀ598ݐ െ46ݐ െ 50
100ݐ 200ݐ + 25ቁ. 
 
It is possible to consider other 11 cases in which ߱௜௝כ (ݐ) assumes minimal or maximal value and, like in the 
previous case, taking into account the direct method, it is possible, under appropriate conditions on the 
functions  ߙ and ߚ, to compute the optimal regulatory tax, the optimal commodity distribution and the 
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production and demand excesses. Let us underline that assuming ߱ଵଵכ (ݐ),߱ଵଶכ (ݐ) both maximal, the previous 
procedure is not allowed since the correspondent commodity shipment  ݔכ(ݐ) does not belong to the constraint 
set ॶ because ݔଵଵכ (ݐ) + ݔଵଶכ (ݐ) > 250ݐ. For this reason,  let us consider the set 
 
ॶ෩ = ൛ݔ א ܮଶ([0,ܶ],Թାସ ): ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔ௜௝(ݐ),   ׊݅ = 1,2,׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1],     
 
              ݔଵଵ(ݐ) + ݔଵଶ(ݐ) = ݌ଵ(ݐ), ݔଶଵ(ݐ) + ݔଶଶ(ݐ) ൑ ݌ଶ(ݐ),         ෍ݔ௜௝(ݐ)  ൑ 
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
ݍ௝(ݐ), ݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1]ൡ. 
 
In order to compute the solution to (18) we make use again of the direct method. We consider the following  
 
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
ݔଵଵכ (ݐ) + ݔଵଶכ (ݐ)െ 250ݐ = 0,
14ݔଵଵכ (ݐ) െ 6ݔଵଶכ (ݐ) െ 2݄ଵଵ(ݐ) + 2݄ଵଶ(ݐ) െ 2ߙ(ݐ) = 0,
െ12ݔଶଵכ (ݐ) + 4ݔଶଶכ (ݐ) + 4݄ଶଵ(ݐ) = 0,
4ݔଶଵכ (ݐ) െ 4ݔଶଶכ (ݐ) + 4݄ଶଶ(ݐ) െ 2ߚ(ݐ) = 0,
ݔכ א  ॶ෩
 
 
and we obtain the following solution, a.e.in [0,1], 
 
ݔכ൫ݐ, ݄(ݐ)൯ = ൮
݄ଵଵ(ݐ)െ ݄ଵଶ(ݐ) + ߙ(ݐ) + 750ݐ
11
െ݄ଵଵ(ݐ) + ݄ଵଶ(ݐ)െ ߙ(ݐ) + 1750ݐ
11
2݄ଶଵ(ݐ) + ʹ݄ଶଶ(ݐ) െ ߚ(ݐ)
4
2݄ଶଵ(ݐ) + 6݄ଶଶ(ݐ) െ 3ߚ(ݐ)
4
൲ 
 
In order to compute the solution to (18), we make use again of the direct method. For ߱௜௝(ݐ) = ߱௜௝כ (ݐ),׊݅ =
1,2,׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1], and remarking that from Definition 3.1 the condition ݔଵ௝(ݐ) ൑ ݔଵ௝(ݐ) ൑
ݔଵ௝(ݐ),   ׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1], implies ݄ଵ௝כ (ݐ) = 0,׊݆ = 1,2, a. e. in [0,1], we can consider the following system  
 
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ
݄ଵ௝כ (ݐ) = 0,׊݆ = 1,2,
2݄ଵଵכ (ݐ) + ݄ଵଶכ (ݐ) െ ߙ(ݐ) െ 11߱ଵଵכ (ݐ) = 0,
݄ଵଵכ (ݐ) + ͸݄ଵଶכ (ݐ) െ 6ߙ(ݐ) െ 11߱ଵଶכ (ݐ) = 0,
2݄ଶଵכ (ݐ) + ʹ݄ଶଶכ (ݐ) െ ߚ(ݐ) െ 4߱ଶଵכ (ݐ) = 0,
2݄ଶଵכ (ݐ) + ͸݄ଶଶכ (ݐ)െ 3ߚ(ݐ) െ 4߱ଶଶכ (ݐ) = 0,
 
 
and we get the following solutions a. e. in [0,1], 
 
݄כ(ݐ) = ൭
0 0
3߱ଶଵכ (ݐ)െ ߱ଶଶכ (ݐ) െ߱ଶଵכ (ݐ) + ߱ଶଶכ (ݐ) +
1
2
ߚ(ݐ)൱, 
and, moreover,  ߱11
כ (ݐ) =
ߙ(ݐ)+750ݐ
10
,߱12
כ (ݐ) =
െߙ(ݐ)+1750ݐ
10
. 
Let us study, now, the case 
 
߱כ(ݐ) = ൭
ߙ(ݐ) + 750ݐ
10
െߙ(ݐ) + 1750ݐ
10
100ݐ 200ݐ
൱. 
 
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be ݄ଵଵכ (ݐ) = 0, ݄ଵଶכ (ݐ) = 0, ݄ଶଵכ (ݐ) > 0, ݄ଶଶכ (ݐ) > 0, 
that are true if and only if ߚ(ݐ) > െ200ݐ. Hence, the optimal regulatory tax and the optimal commodity 
distribution are 
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݄כ(ݐ) = ቆ
0 0
100ݐ ଵ
ଶ
ߚ(ݐ) + 100ݐቇ,   ݔ
כ(ݐ) = ቆ
ఈ(௧)ା଻ହ଴௧
ଵ଴
ିఈ(௧)ାଵ଻ହ଴௧
ଵ଴
100ݐ 200ݐ
ቇ, 
 
which belongs to ॶ෩  if and only if െ250ݐ ൑ ߙ(ݐ) ൑ 250ݐ. Hence, the production and demand excesses are 
ߝ(ݐ) = ቀ 0
200ݐቁ , ߜ
(ݐ) = ቌ
ଶଶହ଴௧ିఈ(௧)
ଵ଴
ଵଶହ଴௧ାఈ(௧)
ଵ଴
ቍ. In particular, if ߙ(ݐ) = 10ݐ, ߚ(ݐ) = 100ݐ + 100, by the algorithm 
described in the previous section, we obtain the solution shown in Figure 2. It represents the numerical 
approximation of the following exact optimal regulatory tax: 
 
݄כ(ݐ) = ቀ 0 0
100ݐ 150ݐ + 50ቁ. 
 
Finally, we remark that when ߱ଵଵכ (ݐ),߱ଵଶכ (ݐ) are both maximal, it is possible to consider other 3 cases in 
which ߱௜௝כ (ݐ) (݅ = 2, ݆ = 1,2) are minimal or maximal and, taking into account the direct method, like in 
last part, it is possible to compute the optimal regulatory tax, the optimal commodity distribution and the 
production and demand excesses under appropriate conditions on the functions  ߙ and ߚ. 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper wants to be a more complete study of the optimal control theory for the dynamic oligopolistic 
market equilibrium problem under tax regulation than the one considered in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013). Like 
in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013), at first we show the equivalence between the equilibrium definition given 
through the Lagrange multipliers and an evolutionary variational inequality. Later, we introduced control 
policies for the regulation of exportations from a policy-maker’s point of view and proved the equivalence with 
an inverse variational inequality that, in turn, is equivalent to an appropriate variational inequality. This made 
possible the study about existence and regularity of equilibrium solutions. The most remarkable difference with 
the study done in (Barbagallo & Mauro, 2013) is the presence of both production and demand excesses, even if 
they influence only the first part of the model because the tax regulation depends mainly on the capacity 
constraints. Moreover, a numerical method, for solving the inverse variational inequality associated with the 
policy-maker’s point of view for the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem, is presented.  
 
Figure 1: Curves of optimal regulatory tax. Figure 2: Curves of optimal regulatory tax. 
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